The Ethnic Cleansing in Khojaly in 1992 – a Revengeful Cruelty or a Cold-Blood Calculated Act? – Part 2

The text proposed below is part of a study of the extreme forms of cruelty manifested during military operations in recent times, especially in the second half of the 20th century. It is the result of long-term joint work of the two authors. What has been written should in no way be taken as an attempt to create a negative attitude towards Armenians, wherever they live - in Armenia, in Nagorno-Karabakh or in Bulgaria. Also, in no way should any connection be sought between the publication and the recent visit of President Rumen Radev to Armenia.

(Continued from February 22, 2018 The previous part examined the facts concerning the tragedy in Khojaly and how they were documented by various independent sources.) 

About the strategic importance of the city of Khojaly as the reason that heralded the pogrom against its peaceful population

The importance of Khojaly was special for both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani side. The settlement was located on the Stepanakert - Askeran road, effectively blocking the regional center. According to the Armenian side, both Stepanakert and Askeran were methodically destroyed with artillery fire (according to others - with mortar fire) from Khojaly. In addition, Khojaly practically cut off the northern part of Nagorno-Karabakh from its southern part.

In addition, Khojaly was home to the only airport in Nagorno-Karabakh through which the besieged Armenians could connect with the rest of the world. So, on the eve of the storming of Khojaly and the tragic events that followed, both sides perfectly understood the strategic importance of the city. [28], [29]. Accordingly, both sides have been preparing for the upcoming clash.

The expansion of Khojaly and its settlement with Meskhetian Turks, displaced from Uzbekistan, Azerbaijanis from the interior of the country, and refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh itself caused particular irritation on the Armenian side. Armenians perceived what was happening as a "targeted policy to change the demographic situation". [29] According to data from the Moscow Human Rights Center "Memorial", published in the newspaper "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" on June 18, 1992, in the period 1989-1991, the population of Khojaly grew from 2135 to 6300 people. Again in 1991, Khojaly was declared a city, which further inflamed emotions among Armenian nationalists. [29]

According to the Armenian side, Azerbaijan strengthened its presence in Khojaly not only by demographic means. Armenian authors usually refer to Kiril Stolyarov's book - "Disintegration: From Nagorno-Karabakh to Belovezhskaya Pusta". [31]

Undoubtedly, Stolyarov is an author who was personally close to the President of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov, and had access to first-hand information. It is difficult to judge to what extent anything written by him can be taken at face value, because he quite clearly takes Mutalibov's side in his polemics with his political opponents from the People's Front of Azerbaijan, but nevertheless his book is an important source of information. (Ayaz Mutalibov was the first president of Azerbaijan. Before that he was the head of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and a member of the Politburo of the CPSU).

According to data taken from Stolyarov's book, more than 35 thousand submachine guns and machine guns, as well as the necessary quantities of ammunition for them, were delivered to the Khojaly region, as well as to the nearest regional center - the city of Agdam. [31, p. 268]. Again, Stolyarov reports that in the middle of February 1992, President Mutalibov ordered eleven tanks and twelve BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles to be transferred to the Khojaly region. [31, p. 251]. At today's level of armed confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, these are very modest numbers, but then such a number of military equipment could have had a serious impact on the course of hostilities.

Realizing that the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were trapped, short of food and ammunition, and for sure will try to take control of the Khojaly airport, Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov ordered the destruction of the runways and other infrastructure of the airport in Khojaly. [31, p. 255].

But even if they could not use the airport, the Armenians wanted at all costs to get their hands on Khojaly, due to its proximity to the main administrative center of Nagorno-Karabakh - Stepanakert. It was not about military considerations of a short-term and tactical nature.

As Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan writes¹, "the storming of Khojaly had another circumstance for the Armenians, no less important than breaking through the blockade: Stepanakert, especially in view of Azerbaijan's accumulated military fist in Aghdam, needed a deeply echeloned defense. The presence of a rapidly growing and well-armed Azerbaijani city seriously complicated the defense of the capital of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. In this way, there was an urgent need for a preventive, pre-emptive offensive, caused not only by the desire to stop the destruction in Stepanakert and the nearby Armenian villages, but also to ensure the viability of the Armenian state. [29]

These words indicate that in the battle for Khojaly, the Armenian side clearly saw a pledge for the existence of the independent Armenian state. Khojaly is seen as a threat both because of its military-strategic importance and because it is a "fast-growing and well-armed Azerbaijani city".

In his memories of the battles at Khojaly, which he defined as a "glorious victory of the Armenian weapons", Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan unequivocally wrote about Khojaly: "the newly born city was doomed to become an arena of cruel battles. This is exactly what both sides were preparing for."

The author of these reflections is not only one of the most informed people about the history and details of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war, but also a direct participant in many of the heaviest military operations, including the operation to capture and "cleanse" the city. He explicitly emphasizes that he has the complete statistics on the Armenian forces that participated in the battles for Khojaly.

Explaining the increased combat capability of the Armenian units on the eve of the battles for Khojaly, Melik-Shahnazaryan unwittingly gives us an idea of the complete inability of the already disintegrated Soviet Union (which became the CIS) in any way to counteract the deadly conflict in Transcaucasia.

He wrote: “On the other hand, the Armenian formations were already significantly better armed than a few months ago. The fact is that at the very end of the fall of 1991, the Armenian side managed to disarm the militia regiment stationed in Stepanakert and seized its weapons and ammunition. At the time, this regiment was sent to counter the international clashes in Artsakh. But when the USSR was on the verge of collapse, the command of the regiment was confused, and the rank-and-file militiamen did not want to protect the property of the dying country at the cost of their own blood. Well, here the negotiations naturally played their role. Moreover, from our side, these negotiations were conducted by people who were determined enough". [29]

As they say, after the "determined people" managed to scare an entire militia regiment from the internal troops of the former USSR, it was not particularly difficult for them to cause real terror fver the civilian population of Khojaly. After all, they already had enough technical means for this.

According to Levon Melik-Shahnazarian:

“However this happened, the armament of the regiment, including armored vehicles, ended up in our hands. By the way, this fact that the Armenians advancing towards Khojaly used three BMPs was used by the Azerbaijanis in their propaganda. To this day, they are trying to convince the world that units of the 366th regiment of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR stationed in Stepanakert participated in the offensive against Khojaly. However, as it turns out, we didn't need any side help. We prepared more than seriously for the operation.

And although the writer of these lines has at hand all the statistics connected with the fighting, yet for the present I will refrain from publishing the total number of boys who took part in the battle. I will only say that during the storming of Khojaly, there were qualitative changes in the Armenian formations, and this was not only related to the armament. I will note if only one fact: many of our volunteer detachments had already grown to the size of companies”. [29].

According to Armenian sources and especially according to Melik-Shahnazaryan himself, the operation of capturing Khojaly was aimed not only to take the the city under control, but also to push the local population out of it, in the direction of the regional center of Aghdam. The evidence for this thesys is the very disposition of the Armenian forces, described in detail in Armenian sources. It is seen from the Armenian statements cited above, that the problem for the separatists was not only in Khojaly as a fortified point from which Stepanakert could be shelled. The problem was that the presence of a large city inhabited by Azerbaijanis near Stepanakert was perceived as a threat to the security of the so called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, built by the Karabakh Armenians. It is regrettable to admit that the plan for ethnic cleansing of Khojaly was already laid down in the plan for its capture.

Levon Melik-Shahnazarian writes:

"The operation was developed and led by Commandos. He was also the immediate commander. From the map drawn up by him and attached here, it can be seen that our units had to enter Khojaly from four directions. …

I must not forget to say that on the side of the greater part of the right bank of the Karkar river, our detachments were not in action. This space was intended for the exit of the peaceful population and for the retreat of the Azerbaijani soldiers. We sought to avoid inflicting heavy casualties on the civilian population. Moreover, we understood that if the Azerbaijanis had no opportunity to escape, they would be forced to fight to the end. Of course, this would not affect the outcome of the operation, but we sought to avoid unnecessary casualties. …

It was explained to the boys that the small Armenian people had no right to fight under such instructions (the standard instructions in the Soviet army, where it was explicitly emphasized that in street fighting in urban conditions, an increase in the number of victims of the attacking side by 20 - 25 percent should be expected. Note Auth.) that every soldier is dear to us, that the operation was developed in such a way as to avoid casualties as much as possible. In addition, the boys were reminded of Order No. 1, which spoke of the inadmissibility of violence against civilians and prisoners. Anyway, the operation started late, as is well known today, on February 25 at 11:00 p.m." [29]

After all, why?

One of the easy explanations is that it is the rage common to combat and an act of revenge. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh is simply one of the peaks of the escalating hatred and intolerance between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which began with marches and protests, went through mutual pogroms and continued in full force on the Karabakh battlefield.

According to Thomas de Waal, it is possible that there was symbolism in the choice of the date of the attack - February 25 vs. 26, 1992. Four years earlier, pogroms against the local Armenian population were committed in Sumgait. Therefore, de Waal does not rule out the possibility that such a coincidence was sought, especially since the battle for Khojaly grew into a cruel revenge. [23, p. 151]

However, here is the place to cite a very important quote from Thomas de Waal's book, which has become the main argument of the Azerbaijani side in its efforts to prove the intentionality of the massacre in Khojaly. Thomas de Waal quotes today's President of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, then an important Armenian military commander: 

"When Armenian military commander Serzh Sargsyan was asked to talk about the capture of Khojaly, he cautiously replied: 'We prefer not to speak out about it.' As for the number of victims, according to him, "many things were exaggerated", and the fleeing Azerbaijanis offered armed resistance. However, regarding the occasion of the events that took place, Sargsyan spoke more honestly and firmly: "But I think the main issue was something else entirely. Until Khojaly, the Azerbaijanis thought that they could make fun of us, they thought that the Armenians were not capable of raising a hand against the civilian population. We managed to break that [stereotype]. Here's what happened. And it should also be borne in mind that among these boys (the Armenian fighters at Khojaly, Bel. Author) there were people who had fled from Baku and from Sumgait". [23, p. 152]

One of the cases when the Azerbaijani side once again quoted Serzh Sargsyan's statement written by Thomas de Waal was the publicized "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Khojaly Genocide" dated February 25, 2017. [25] There, President Sargsyan's quote is given in an abbreviated form, although this does not distort the meaning of what he said. Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the statement as a "cynical admission of guilt" by "the then Defense Minister of Armenia and current President Serzh Sargsyan." [25]

Thomas de Waal himself gives a very serious meaning to this statement, which Sargsyan will probably regret for the rest of his life. According to de Waal:

"Sarkisyan's assessment forces us to look at the cruelest slaughterhouse in the Karabakh war from a different angle. It is possible that these mass murders were, even in part, deliberate acts of intimidation." [23, p. 153]

As shown above, the plan to capture Khojaly from the beginning envisaged pushing the local population out of it. The push is explicitly laid out in the plan and a route is provided for it. At least in theory, a corridor was left (along the right bank of the Karkar River) from where both the civilian population and the Azerbaijani soldiers could withdraw. A large part of the refugees set off on this exact route, and at one point the fire of the Armenian outposts poured down on them.

The Armenian narrative on the preparation of the operation mentions "Order No. 1" of the command of the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh forces, which prohibits the use of violence against the civilian population and prisoners, but subsequently none of the journalists who arrived at the scene of the tragedy and investigators from various organization managed to see it in written form. It is talked about, but there is no written text – “black ink over a white sheet”. This is particularly clearly commented on in the "Memorial" investigation, which cannot be suspected of simpathy towards the Azerbaijani side. [24]

The case is too close to a similar one from the war in eastern Ukraine. In the late summer of 2014 at the end of August, the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, together with several volunteer battalions, launched an offensive bypassing Donetsk. Initially, the offensive was going particularly well, and the Ukrainians were about to cut off Donetsk from the Russian border and threaten the capital of the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People Republic” (“DPR””) from the east. The last stop before Donetsk was the city of Ilovaisk.

The Ukrainian forces entered the city, but while engaged in heavy street fighting, they were unexpectedly attacked and surrounded by superior forces. (Various military analysts, combatants, and politicians of various backgrounds have publicly stated that the Ukrainians were attacked by regular Russian troops who crossed the border to aid the “DPR” separatists). Somewhere around August 27-28, 2014, the so-called "Ilovai cauldron" was formed.

On August 29, 2014, the President of Russia - Vladimir Putin, appealed to the leadership of the "DNR" to give the encircled Ukrainian forces the opportunity to leave the encirclement by opening the so-called "humanitarian corridor". According to the testimonies of the participants in the fighting, when leaving the "cauldron", fire was opened on the Ukrainian columns with light and heavy weapons, including "Grad" volley fire systems. According to different assessments of participants in the fighting on the Ukrainian side, as well as the "Senchenko" commission, which investigated the case, the Ukrainian side lost more than 1,000 people killed during the exit through the "humanitarian corridor".

We have no way of knowing to what extent the participants in the events surrounding the "Ilovai Cauldron" on the part of the “DNR” were familiar with the case in Khojaly in detail, but the similarity between the two cases is indisputable. Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty whether the organization of an ambush of civilians and fighters from the garrison fleeing from Khojaly was planned in advance or was improvised during the operation.

If the words of Serzh Sargsyan, that with the massacre in Khojaly, the Armenians convinced the Azerbaijanis that they cannot be joked with, are not a " lapsus lingve" and unsuccessful wit, appears a reasonable suspicion of intentionality in the mass atrocities committed.

There is no doubt that there were sufficient military considerations for the Armenians to attack Khojaly.

From the memories of Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan, it is clear that the Armenians looked at the newly declared city of Khojaly with hostility and anxiety, because they perceived it as an Azerbaijani demographic bastion and a military citadel in dangerous proximity to the capital of the self-proclaimed “Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” - Stepanakert.

Again, from Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan's writings, we know that the ethnic cleansing of Khojaly was included in the plan for the capture of the strategic settlement, of course without specifying whether there would be excesses on the civilian population or whether they would only be driven out. But great importance was given to the expulsion of the Azerbaijani population.

If we take literally what Serzh Sargsyan stated, it turns out that the ethnic cleansing was originally planned to inflict a psychological blow on the Azerbaijanis by shocking them with the cruelty towards the civilian population. The logic here is no different from aerial bombing or artillery shelling of residential areas in any war since the First World War.

With this arrangement of facts and this logical interpretation of events, considering the massacre in Khojaly as an act of revenge takes a secondary position. At most, for some of the Armenian fighters, it was a "side effect" and a source of "additional satisfaction". There is reasonable suspicion of intentionality in the atrocities committed.

Appendix № 1

Biographical data on Arkady Ivanovich Ter-Tadevosyan (Commandos), head of the operation for capturing Khojaly

Arkady Ivanovich Ter-Tadevosyan (Artush Oganesovich Tadevosyan), also known among Armenian fighters as "Commandos", was born on May 22, 1939. He was a Soviet and Armenian major general, arguably the commander-in-chief of the Armenian armed forces during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and former Deputy Minister of Defense of Armenia. [2] Ter-Tadevosyan is best known as the commander of the operation to capture the city of Shusha in May 1992. [14]

Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan was born in Tbilisi, Georgian SSR. After graduating from high school in Tbilisi, he headed for a career in the Soviet Army. He received his military education in Baku - he graduated from the Baku General Military Command School. After that, he graduated from the Leningrad Rear and Transport Military Academy. Participated in the war in Afghanistan, where he earned the nickname "Mountain Fox". He continued his military service in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Belarus.

For some time he taught at the Agricultural Institute, established on the basis of the Faculty of Agriculture of the Yerevan State University. (In 1994, the Agricultural Institute was restructured into the Armenian National Agrarian University).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ter-Tadevosyan gradually became involved in organizing the Armenian defense. In 1990, he joined the volunteer group "David of Sassoon".

Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan is the grandson of a priest from the city of Kars, who survived the extermination of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and claims that he himself was never an apologist for aggression:

"I was and remain a person outside of politics. I was really scared by the presence of many random people in the nationwide movement, I was scared by their irresponsibility. For a long time, I myself went towards an adequate perception of this movement itself".Поводът, който окончателно предопределя избора на опитния полковник да влезе във войната става сформирането на опълченския отряд „Давид от Сасун“. Тер-Тадевосян разказва:

"The level of training of the militia unit "David of Sassoon" formed in Yerevan shocked me - it was obvious that these desperate boys go to the front not to fight, but to die. I had to teach them elementary "a" and "b" of military affairs. [20]

On July 13, 1991, Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan went to Nagorno-Karabakh to train Armenian fighters. He participated in the formation of the Armenian Armed Forces and helped them overcome significant challenges before becoming a well-developed institution. [1]

The arrival of then 51-year-old Soviet Army colonel Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan in Nagorno-Karabakh was considered a turning point, and he was seen as an alternative to the chaos and as an antithesis to the division between the different brigades of the Armenian militia. It was he who pointed out the necessity of integrating the available modest military resources of the Armenians and introduced a competent staff command. He had the necessary skills to persuade the turbulent commanders of the fragmented Armenian detachments to put aside their party conflicts and unite in the name of the need for joint defense. [20]

It is believed that in the month of August 1991, the Azerbaijani commanders already felt that a new Armenian general had appeared against them - a competent military man and a master of defensive operations.

In September 1991, for the first time during the Karabakh war, 40 servicemen from the Soviet army were captured. Interestingly, the Armenian side claims that this detachment was carrying out an order of the Supreme Command to deport the Armenian population. Ter-Tadevossian claims: 

"The capture took place in the area of the village of Aterk. We captured them and brought them back - the boys were not mercenaries or fighters from the Azerbaijani units. Ordinary conscripts sent to the Karabakh cauldron. They were not to blame for that." [20]

In October 1991, a new successful operation was carried out in the area of the village of Toh, accompanied by the capture of the strategic height of Sarushen, from where the regional center - Gadrut - was shelled. The capturing of this height became the prototype of the Shusha capturing operation, codenamed "Wedding in the Mountains". On May 9, 1992, the Armenian armed forces captured the citadel of the Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh - Shusha.

The Armenian researchers - historians and journalists emphasize that the "Wedding in the Mountains" operation became the "crown of the military biography" of Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan (he developed the plan to storm this natural fortress and he is known in Armenia as "the soul of the liberation of Shushi" [27]) and "the first large-scale action carried out under the leadership of the unified Defense Staff of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic".

Here, the Armenian sources carefully sidestep the fact that the operation to capture Shusha was preceded by the capture of Khojaly, which took place again under the command of Ter-Tadevosyan. Unlike his biographers, Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan does not at all deny his participation in the capture of Khojaly (Khojalu), but he categorically denies the massacre of civilians. [26]

On May 25, 1992, Ter-Tadevosyan was promoted to major general for his achievements during the Nagorno-Karabakh war. He also received the Order of the Battle Cross (1st degree).

In 2009, the „President“ of the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” - Bako Sahakyan, declared him a "Hero of Artsakh" and awarded him the "Order of the Golden Eagle" [15] on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the capture of Shusha in 2009. For years, Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan remains closely connected to the region. In 2010, he shared that he spent there at least a week every month. [27] At that time, Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan supervised the training of specialists in the Armenian Armed Forces.

He is the recipient of many military awards: Order of the Red Banner (USSR); Order "Badge of Honor" (USSR); Medal "Veteran of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" (USSR); Jubilee medal "Twenty years since the victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945" (USSR); Jubilee medal "50 years Armed Forces of the USSR" (USSR); Jubilee medal "60 years Armed Forces of the USSR" (USSR); Jubilee medal "70 years Armed Forces of the USSR" (USSR); Jubilee medal "Fifty years since the victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945" (USSR); Medal "For impeccable service" 1st degree (USSR - for 20 years of impeccable service); Medal "For impeccable service" 2nd degree (USSR - for 15 years of impeccable service); Medal "For impeccable service" 3rd degree (USSR - for 10 years of impeccable service); Order of the Military Cross 1st degree (Armenia); Hero of Artsakh and recipient of the Order of the Golden Eagle (Republic of Artsakh) – 2009.

References: 

[1] ACNIS Salutes the Armenian Armed Forces on Army Day, The Armenian Center for National and International Studies, January 28, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20131029214431/http://acnis.am/pr/280110/index.htm

[2] Armenian general on OSCE MG co-chairs’ parity, Armenian News – Tert.am, 01. 05. 2012, 17:09, http://www.tert.am/en/news/2012/05/01/co-chairs/495071

[3] Atanesyan Vahram, Thomas Goltz: The godfather of the Legend of the “Khojaly Genocide”, July 25, 2013, https://horizonweekly.ca/am/13317-2/ 

[4] Bodies Mark Site of Karabagh Massacre. The Times, 3 March 1992.

[5] Corpses litter Hills in Karabakh, The Times, 2 March, 1992.

[6] Fighting intensifies in Armenian – Azerbaijani War, The New York Times, September 25, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/25/world/fighting-intensifies-in-armenian-azerbaijani-war.html

[7] Fisk Robert, Echoes of Stalinism abound in the very modern Azerbaijan – Armenia conflict. The same old enemies are clanking around the black mountains of Karabagh: Russian power, Tutkish expansionism and Armenian nationalism, The Independent, Saturday, 9 April, 2016, 13:16 BST, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/echoes-of-stalinism-abound-in-the-very-modern-azerbaijan-armenia-conflict-a6976421.html

[8] Garagozov Rauf, The Khojaly tragedy as a collective trauma and factor of collective memory, Azerbaijan in the World, Online Analytical Input From Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, Vol. 3, No 5, Marvh 01, 2010, http://biweekly.ada.edu.az/vol_3_no_5/The_Khojaly_tragedy_as_a_collective_trauma_and_factor_of_collective_memory.htm

[9] Goltz Thomas, Nagorno-Karabakh Victims Buried in Azerbaijani Town, The Washington Post, February 28, 1992, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/02/28/nagorno-karabakh-victims-buried-in-azerbaijani-town/9d179769-e6bb-4476-8807-8d5133d40205/?utm_term=.a8d95f909517

[10] Goltz Thomas, Armenian Soldiers Massacre Hundreds of Fleeing Families, The Sunday Times, 1 march 1992.

[11] Killen Brian, Atrocity Reports Horrify Azerbaijan, The Washington Times, 3 March 1992.

[12] Lieven Anatol, Massacre Uncovered, The Times, 3 March, 1992.

[13] Massacre by Armenians Being Reported, The New York Times, March 3, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/03/world/massacre-by-armenians-being-reported.html

[14] Melkonian Markar and Seta Gpranyan-Melkonian, My Brothers Road: An American’s Fateful Journey to Armenia, I.B. Tauris, 2005

[15] NKR President decorates Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan with the Golden Eagle Order, President of the Artsakh Republic - Bako S. Sahakyan, 09. 05. 2009, http://www.president.nkr.am/en/photosAndVideos/photoalbum/5/474/ 

[16] Painful Search, The Independent, 12 June, 1992.

[17] Privat Pascal and Steve Le Vine, The Face of a Massacre, Newsweek, 16 March, 1992.

[18] Quinn-Judge Paul, Armenians killed 1000, Azeris charge, The Boston Globe, 3 march 1992.

[19] Smolowe Jill and Yuri Zarakhovich, Massacre in Khojaly, 16 March, 1992.

[20] Аркадий Тер-Тадевосян (1939 года рождения), New Armenia Net, http://www.newarmenia.net/index.php?id=311&name=Pages&op=view 

[21] Де Ваал Том, Глава 6. 1988 – 1990 г.г., Азербайджанская трагедия, Главы из русского издания книги „Черный сад“, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/in_depth/newsid_4664000/4664799.stm

[22] Де Ваал Том, Черный сад. Между миром и войной, Главы из русского издания книги „Черный сад“, 15 июля 2005 г., 08:06 GMT, 12:06 МСК, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/in_depth/newsid_4673000/4673979.stm 

[23] Де Ваал Томас, Черный сад. Армения и Азербайджан между миром и войной, Издательство „Текст“, перевод Олега Алякринского, 2005 г., https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/system/uploads/article_attachment/attach/0002/24358/Chernyy_sad._Armeniya_i_Azerbaydzhan_mezhdu_mirom_i_voynoy.pdf 

[24] Доклад правозащитного центра „Мемориал“ о массовых нарушениях прав человека, связанных с занятием населенного пункта Ходжали в ночь с 25 на 26 февраля 1992 г. вооруженными формированиями, http://old.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/karabah/HOJALY/Chapter1.htm#_VPID_5 

[25] Изявление на Министерството на външните работи на Република Азербайджан по повод на 25-та годишнина от геноцида в Ходжали, 25 февруари 2017 г., http://sofia.mfa.gov.az/bg/news/148/3084

[26] Коларов Георги, Ген. Аркадий Тер-Тадевосян: Готови сме да унищожим тръбопроводите на Азербайджан, NEWS.bg, 07 януари 2012, 18:52:42, https://news.bg/interviews/gen-arkadiy-ter-tadevosyan-gotovi-sme-da-unishtozhim-traboprovodite-na-azerbaydzhan.html

[27] Матнишян Мариам, Командос: Борьба за выживание, PanARMENIAN News, 2 ноября 2010, http://www.panarmenian.net/rus/details/56211/ 

[28] Мелик – Шахназарян Левон и Гайк Демоян, Ходжалинское дело: Особая папка, http://armenianhouse.org/mshakhnazaryan/docs-ru/khojaly_f/khojaly.html 

[29] Мелик – Шахназарян Левон, Славная победа армянского оружия, 168 hours – news and analysis, February 28, 2017, 09:24, https://ru.168.am/2017/02/28/4414.html 

[30] Министерство на външните работи на Република Азербайджан. Геноцидът в Ходжали, http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/795?options=content&id=850 

[31] Столяров Кирилл, Распад: От Нагорного Карабаха до Беловежской пущи, Москва, 2001 г.

Key words 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Khojaly, killings, ethnic cleansing, Nagorno-Karabakh, Thomas de Waal, Kirill Stolyarov, Artsakh, Askeran, Aghdam, Meskhetian Turks, Levon Melik, Shahnazarian, Arkadiy Ter Tadevosyan, Commandos, Sumgait, Serge Sargsyan, Karkar River, Memorial , Stepanakert, Ayaz Mutalibov, Goltz, Thomas Goltz

1 According to people familiar with the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh, Levon Melik-Shahnazryan actually possessed the complete documentation for the operation to capture Khojaly. There is unconfirmed official information, but originating from relatively reliable sources, that Levon Melki-Shahnazaryan was for some time the Minister of State Security of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, but under a different name. There is information that he changed his name at least once, the reasons for this change being unknown. In connection with these circumstances, he can be considered one of the most informed authors who wrote about the Khojaly tragedy from the Armenian side, although there are no guarantees to what extent he was sincere. Levon Grantovich Melik-Shahnazaryan was born on February 7, 1958 in Kirovabad, today - Ganja. He is an Armenian political scientist, head of the "Voskanapat" analytical center. In 1974, he entered the Institute of Russian Language and Literature in Tashkent and after graduation worked as a teacher in the Department of Russian Linguistics at the Tashkent State Pedagogical Institute. In 1988, he moved to Nagorno-Karabakh, where he worked as a department head of the Executive Committee in the Regional Executive Committee for Work with Refugees from Azerbaijan. He was the vice-chairman of the "Miatsum" ("Unification") movement. In November and December 1988, he was one of the leaders of the Armenian armed volunteers in the city of Ganja (Kirovabad). In December 1991, he was elected a deputy - a member of the first elected Supreme Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from the first convocation. From January 1992 to June 1995, he was the chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on international relations and a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the self-proclaimed republic. In 1995-1997, Levon Melik-Shahnazaryan was the editor of the Russian version of the newspaper "NK Republika." Then, at the end of 1997, he moved to Yerevan, where he lived in his last years. He was a professor of political science at the "Anania Shirakatsi" University of International Relations in Yerevan. He is the author of 5 monographs and more than 500 publications on political science. Married. Father of three children. In 2015, he was awarded the "Garegin Nzhde" medal. He died on August 11, 2015 in Ptgni after a severe and prolonged illness.